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Abstract 
Research has shown that stigmatized 
subjects, defined as members of groups 
about which others hold negative attitudes, 
receiving negative feedback from a 
prejudiced evaluator attribute the nature of 
the feedback to the source rather than to 
their own performance. The purpose of 
this experiment was to determine whether 
this self-protective mechanism also occurs 
in nonstigmatized individuals. Sixty-seven 
subjects, male and female undergraduate 
students enrolled at a small midwestern 
liberal arts college, participated in a 2 x 2 
between-subjects factorial design in which 
the independent variable of evaluator 
prejudice or nonprejudice was crossed with 
stigmatized or nonstigmatized subject 
status. Results of an ANOVA measuring 
the difference between subjects' pre- and 
postmanipulation esteem scores showed a 
significant interaction between evaluator 
prejudice and subject status (p = .009). 
Nonstigmatized subjects' self-esteem was 
elevated by receiving feedback from a 
prejudiced evaluator and decreased by 
receiving feedback from a nonprejudiced 
evaluator. No esteem effects were found in 
the stigmatized subjects. The results 
showed that stigmatized subjects did not 
feel the need to protect their self-esteem by 
elevating their esteem score in the 
prejudiced evaluator condition because they 
were able to attribute the feedback to 
evaluator prejudice. 
According to Crocker and Major 
(1989), stigmatized groups are "social 
categories about which others hold 
negative attitudes, stereotypes, and 
beliefs..."(p. 609). There are several 
conflicting interaction theories regarding 
the effects that interactions with members 
of nonstigmatized groups have on the 
self-esteem of stigmatized group members. 
These theories have been used to support  
one of two opposing ideas. The insulation 
hypothesis is based on the idea that when 
members of stigmatized groups interact 
with members of nonstigmatized groups, 
self-esteem of the stigmatized group 
members declines. The second theory, the 
contact hypothesis, states that the self-
esteem of stigmatized group members will 
not suffer, and may in some cases benefit, 
from interactions with members of 
nonstigmatized groups (Krause, 1983). 
The insulation hypothesis is 
supported by the self-fulfilling prophecy 
theory (Merton, 1948), the symbolic 
interactionist perspective (Cooley, 1956; 
Mead, 1934), the contextual dissonance 
effects theory (Rosenberg, 1977), and the 
efficacy-based self-esteem theory (Gecas & 
Schwalbe, 1983). Each of these positions 
predicts stigmatized group members will 
have lower self-esteem. The contact 
hypothesis is supported by Weiner's 
attributional analysis of emotion theory 
(Weiner, 1985, 1986) and the reformulated 
learned helplessness theory (Abramson, 
Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). These 
theories predict that members of 
stigmatized groups will attribute failure and 
rejection in mainstream society to prejudice 
against their group. This external 
attribution will protect their self-esteem by 
placing the blame for personal failure on 
others. 
The theories and empirical evidence 
that support both the insulation and contact 
hypotheses will be discussed and critiqued. 
Unless otherwise specified, when self-
esteem is mentioned it refers to global self-
esteem. 
The theory of efficacy-based self-
esteem states that members of stigmatized 
groups suffer from decreased self-esteem 
when they interact with members of 
nonstigmatized groups (Gecas & 
Schwalbe, 1983). According to this view, 
self-esteem develops through successful 
and nonsuccessful manipulations of the 
environment. When someone is successful 
in controlling and manipulating their 
environment, they may see themselves as 
competent, able, and powerful, resulting in 
increased self-esteem. On the other hand, 
when the individual's attempt to manipulate 
the environment is blocked or inhibited in 
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some way, as is often the case for 
members of stigmatized groups, the 
resulting frustration may cause feelings of 
failure and lowered self-esteem. According 
to Gecas and Schwalbe (1983), societal 
conditions such as segregation and 
discrimination against members of 
stigmatized groups "can limit the 
possibilities for the formation of efficacy-
based self-esteem by limiting access to 
resources that are necessary for producing 
intended effects" (p. 82). 
In addition to this theory, ideas 
such as equity theory (Adams, 1963), 
social exchange theory (Thibaut & Kelley, 
1959), the self-fulfilling prophecy theory 
(Merton, 1948), the symbolic interactionist 
perspective (Cooley, 1956; Mead, 1934), 
and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986) are also in line with the view that 
social stigma has a negative effect on self-
esteem. In fact, this idea has been so 
widely accepted that, according to Crocker 
and Major (1989), it has been accepted as 
true. Allport (1954/1979) wrote that 
"group oppression may destroy the 
integrity of the ego entirely, and reverse its 
normal pride, and create a groveling self-
image"(p. 152). Similarly, Erikson (1956) 
stated, "There is ample evidence of 
'inferiority' feelings and of morbid self-
hate in all minority groups" (p. 155). 
Despite the diverse theoretical 
perspectives which predict that 
membership in a stigmatized group will 
result in diminished self-esteem, the 
empirical evidence that supports these 
theories is scarce, inadequate, or both. In 
fact, recent research has come to the 
opposite conclusion. Some data indicate 
that members of some stigmatized groups 
have levels of self-esteem equal to or 
higher than that of members of 
nonstigmatized groups. For example, a 
large number of studies have come to the 
conclusion that Blacks have levels of self- 
esteem equal to or higher than that of 
Whites (Hoelter, 1982; Porter & 
Washington, 1979; Rosenberg, 1979; 
Wylie, 1979). Also, two extensive reviews 
have concluded that women do not have 
lower self-esteem than men (Macoby & 
Jacklin, 1974; Wylie, 1979). Research has 
also shown that members of many other  
stigmatized groups do not suffer from 
diminished self-esteem relative to members 
of nonstigmatized groups (Crocker & 
Major, 1989). In fact, according to 
Crocker and Major, "this research, 
conducted over a time span of more than 
20 years, leads to the surprising conclusion 
that prejudice against members of 
stigmatized or oppressed groups generally 
does not result in lowered self-esteem for 
members of those groups" (p. 611). They 
further state that "these findings generalize 
across a variety of stigmatizing conditions, 
a variety of measures of global self-esteem, 
and a wide range of subject populations" 
(p. 611). 
In some cases, gaps in empirical 
evidence of the theories of the 
insulationists can explain discrepancies. 
For example, Rosenberg (1977) states that 
members of stigmatized groups are often 
subject to either racial, ethnic, or sexual 
slurs, or all three. He fails to provide any 
evidence, however, that these slurs are 
internalized and incorporated into the self-
concept. If, on the other hand, members of 
stigmatized groups are able to resist 
integration of the dominant groups' 
perceptions into their self-concept, they 
may be able to simply dismiss these 
dissonant communications. According to 
Krause's (1983) research, this seems to be 
the process that occurs. In his attempt to 
replicate Rosenberg and Simmon's (1972) 
study of Black students' self-esteem, 
Krause was unable to find any significant 
effect of racial teasing on the self-esteem of 
Black students at any grade level. 
Rosenberg (1977) also states that 
people compare themselves to those around 
them in order to develop their self-concept, 
an idea in line with Festinger's (1954) 
theory of social comparison. He states that 
empirical research shows that people do 
not compare themselves with any other, 
but rather with a comparable other. 
Festinger posits that when members of 
stigmatized groups are immersed within the 
majority culture, they will compare 
themselves with those of the majority, and 
hence, feel inferior or powerless. 
However, he did not provide any evidence 
of this, nor was he able to show that 
Blacks have lower self-esteem than 
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Whites. It may be that members of 
stigmatized groups compare themselves 
with members of their own groups rather 
than with out-group members. This point 
is supported by the research of Verkuyten 
(1988). In a study of Black and White 
Dutch youths, Verkuyten found that the 
White youths (members of that society's 
nonstigmatized group) felt that friends and 
teachers were relevant comparison people, 
while Black youths felt that only their 
family members were significant for 
comparisons. 
In addition to modifying the above 
mentioned ideas to fit the empirical 
evidence, researchers have used other 
psychological theories to explain why 
members of stigmatized groups do not 
have lower self-esteem than members of 
nonstigmatized groups. For example, 
Weiner's (1985, 1986) attributional 
analysis of emotion theory and the 
reformulated learned helplessness theory 
(Abramson et al., 1978) give plausible 
explanations for the undiminished self-
esteem of members of stigmatized groups. 
According to these theories, internal 
attributions for positive outcomes and 
external attributions for negative outcomes 
lead to increased self-esteem. Empirical 
evidence generally supports this point (e.g. 
Crocker, Alloy, & Kayne, 1988; Weiner & 
Lerman, 1978, 1979). Because prejudice 
against one's group is an external 
attribution for a negative outcome this 
attribution should protect, and in fact 
enhance, the self-esteem of a stigmatized 
person. 
Crocker and Major (1989), in an 
extensive review of the literature, proposed 
the above point of an attributional defense 
mechanism, and two others, as 
"mechanisms that buffer the self-esteem of 
members of stigmatized or oppressed 
groups from the prejudice of others" (p. 
612). The second mechanism cited by 
Crocker and Major states members of 
stigmatized groups may protect their self-
esteem through selective comparisons 
between their own outcomes and those of 
members of their own group. Festinger 
(1954) states that "the tendency to compare 
oneself with some other specific person 
decreases as the difference between his  
opinion or ability and one's own increases" 
(p. 120). 
Crocker and Major (1989) suggest 
that members of stigmatized groups are 
more likely to make in-group comparisons 
for three reasons: (a) a proximity effect, (b) 
a similarity effect, and (c) a self-protective 
effect. With respect to the proximity effect, 
in-group social comparisons are due to the 
fact that members of the ingroup will often 
be more prevalent in one's immediate 
environment. With regard to the similarity 
effect, it has been found that people 
compare their living standards and social 
status with those whose situations are 
similar to their own (Singer, 1981). In 
fact, preference for comparing oneself with 
similar others is so strong that it has been 
shown to dominate proximal comparisons 
when people are surrounded by their 
outgroups (Crosby, 1982; Rosow, 1974; 
Strauss, 1968). The third way in which 
members of stigmatized groups may 
protect their self-esteem is by selectively 
devaluing the dimensions on which their 
group performs poorly and selectively 
valuing those dimensions on which their 
group fares well (Crocker & Major, 1989). 
This idea is based on the premise that if a 
certain dimension is not centrally important 
to an individual, then failure on that 
dimension will not lower the person's self-
esteem (Harter, 1986; Rosenberg, 1979; 
Rosenberg & Simmons, 1972). 
It was hypothesized that the four 
groups in this study should differ in how 
they reacted to negative feedback and the 
extent to which they internalized it. 
Specifically, participants in the stigmatized/ 
prejudiced evaluator condition would show 
the least change between pretest and 
posttest self-esteem scores because they 
would attribute the negative feedback to 
external factors, rather than to their own 
performances. It was also predicted that 
participants in the nonstigmatized/ 
prejudiced evaluator condition would show 
a slight decrease in self-esteem because, 
although they had reason to attribute the 
negative feedback externally, they would 
not have had as much practice doing it as 
the members of the stigmatized groups, 
and therefore they would not be as efficient 
in externalizing feedback. Participants in 
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the other two conditions were predicted to 
show equivalent decreases in self-esteem, 
greater than those of participants in the 
nonstigmatized/prejudiced evaluator 
condition, because they had no external 
sources for which to attribute their failures. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-seven undergraduate male 
and female students currently enrolled at a 
midwestern liberal arts college who were 
registered in psychology classes during the 
Spring term of 1994 participated in this 
experiment. Participants received extra 
credit towards their final grade for 
participating. 
Design 
This experiment utilized a 2 x 2 
between-subjects factorial design. The ex 
post facto variables were gender, and the 
two levels were male and female. The other 
independent variable, with two levels, was 
a prejudiced or nonprejudiced evaluator, as 
conveyed by an attitude survey. The 
dependent variable was changes in global 
self-esteem levels as measured by the 
Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale. 
Materials 
The Rosenberg Self-Esteem scale 
was used to measure subjects' global self-
esteem levels. The attitude survey used 
expressed the fictitious evaluators' 
opinions on several different topics, 
including male and female gender role 
issues. This survey contained five 
questions pertaining to attitudes towards 
women and five questions pertaining to 
attitudes towards men. Responses to all 
questions were given on a five-point scale, 
ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 
(strongly disagree). Subjects received one 
of three different attitude surveys from 
their fictitious evaluators which showed the 
evaluator as being prejudiced against 
women, prejudiced against men, or neutral 
on issues of gender. All subjects received 
the same negative evaluation from the 
fictitious evaluator stating that the 
participant knew little about affirmative  
action, and that the essay the participant 
wrote was poorly written and missed many 
arguments. 
Procedure 
Participants were asked by either 
their instructor or the experimenter to 
participate in a two-part experiment which 
was being conducted as part of a Senior 
Honors Project. Subjects completed the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, the first part 
of the experiment, at least five days prior to 
participation in the second part of the 
experiment. At this time, they also 
scheduled a half-hour appointment to 
complete the second part of the experiment. 
They were told that they would receive 
extra credit in exchange for participation in 
both parts of the study. 
During the second part of the 
experiment, subjects were put into a small 
room with only a desk, a computer, and a 
printer, and asked to complete a short 
attitude survey. They were then told that 
their attitude surveys would be shown to 
their partners in the experiment, and that 
they too would be allowed to see their 
partner's attitude survey. After completing 
the attitude survey, subjects were given 
instructions to type their gender and an 
essay on the computer describing their 
opinions on affirmative action. The 
instructions stated that their essays were to 
be evaluated by their partner (who was 
actually fictitious) based on the strength, 
clarity, and number of their arguments. 
Subjects were told they had 10 min to 
complete their essays and not to worry 
about spelling or punctuation because it 
was not a factor in the experiment. They 
were instructed to express as many 
arguments, both for and against their 
position, rather than focus on one or two 
arguments in great detail. Subjects were 
also told that they would evaluate the essay 
of the (fictitious) person who was 
evaluating them. 
After the 10-min time limit elapsed, 
the experimenter returned and printed out 
the essay. The experimenter explained that 
the subject's essay would be evaluated first 
and that as soon as the subject's partner 
had evaluated his or her essay, the 
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experimenter would return with the 
evaluation and give the subject a chance to 
read it. Subjects were told that the 
experimenter would then return and give 
them the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. 
Subjects were told that this would help 
them to focus more on themselves and less 
on the essay or evaluation, so that they 
could evaluate their partner's essay with an 
open mind. The experimenter then sealed 
each subject's attitude survey and essay in 
an envelope and asked the subject to write 
a number across the seal so that they would 
be identified only by number and not by 
name. The experimenter then gave each 
subject the attitude survey of their fictitious 
partner to look at while they waited for 
their essay to be evaluated. 
In the prejudiced evaluator 
condition, this attitude survey expressed 
negative attitudes towards each subject's 
gender, while it expressed positive 
attitudes regarding the opposite gender, 
thus giving the subjects the impression that 
their evaluator was prejudiced against the 
subject's gender. In the nonprejudiced 
evaluator condition, the attitude survey 
showed neutral attitudes on all issues of 
gender. Subjects were then left alone for 7 
min to give them ample time to read the 
fictitious subject's attitude survey. After 7 
min had elapsed, the experimenter returned 
with a computer printout of the evaluator's 
critique of the subjects' essay. All 
evaluations were negative, citing poor 
clarity with few arguments. All essays 
were judged as generally nonpersuasive. 
The experimenter then left for 3 
min while the subjects read the evaluations. 
The experimenter then returned with the 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale for the 
subject to complete, explaining again that 
this would help control for the effects that 
their present mood, positive or negative, 
would have on the evaluation of the 
fictitious subject's essay. After completion 
of this item, subjects were asked if they 
had any suspicions about the experiment. 
Those whose suspicions were such that 
they did not believe they had a partner in 
the experiment, or that the evaluation of 
their essay was not from their partner were 
noted for possible exclusion from the data 
set. Subjects were then fully debriefed and  
given back their unopened essays and 
attitude surveys. 
Results 
Eighteen of the subjects' data were 
eliminated from the analysis because it was 
determined during debriefing that they 
were aware of the hypothesis of the 
experiment, or were suspicious that they 
had not been paired with a real partner. 
This was done to avoid the possibility that 
their behavior was influenced by demand 
characteristics, which would contaminate 
the results. The following is a breakdown 
of how many subjects' data were 
eliminated from each group: female/ 
prejudiced = 4, female/nonprejudiced = 3, 
male/prejudiced = 6, male/nonprejudiced = 
5. The final number of subjects used for 
data analysis was 49. 
A two-way ANOVA was used to 
analyze the difference scores of subjects' 
self-esteem before and after the 
manipulation. No significant main effects 
for subject stigmatization status or 
evaluator prejudice were detected. 
However, a significant interaction between 
the two variables of subject gender and 
stigmatization status was obtained, F(1, 
48) = 7.42, p = .009. The mean difference 
scores in the four experimental conditions 
showed that nonstigmatized subjects who 
received feedback from a prejudiced 
evaluator displayed the highest increase in 
self-esteem scores (M = 3.33), whereas 
receiving feedback from a nonprejudiced 
evaluator resulted in decreased self-esteem 
for the nonstigmatized subjects (M = 
-1.36). Follow-up comparisons using the 
Tukey HSD test revealed that the only 
significant difference existed between the 
mean scores for nonstigmatized subjects (q 
= 4.25). No significant difference existed 
for stigmatized subjects receiving feedback 
from a prejudiced evaluator (M = .36) or a 
nonprejudiced evaluator (M = 1.27). 
Four separate t-tests were 
computed to ascertain whether the changes 
in self-esteem in the four different 
conditions differed significantly from zero 
(i.e. if a mean of -1.36 actually indicated a 
drop in self-esteem). None of the t-tests 
showed significance in any of the cell 
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means. However, in the nonstigmatized-
prejudiced evaluator condition a value of 
t(8) = 1.92, p = .09 was obtained. 
Discussion 
The analysis revealed a significant 
difference between the change scores of 
nonstigmatized subjects. This could be due 
to the possibility that when nonstigmatized 
individuals received negative feedback 
which they determined to be unfair due to 
the prejudiced nature of the evaluator, they 
saw the second administration of the self-
esteem test as a legitimate opportunity to 
reaffirm their self-concepts, and thus 
inflated their self-esteem scores. However, 
having no external source to attribute the 
negative feedback too, those subjects in the 
nonprejudiced evaluator condition seemed 
to have internalized the feedback into their 
self-concepts, as evidenced by the 
significant difference between their change 
scores and those of their counterparts. 
The post hoc comparisons of 
means did not reveal a significant 
difference between the change scores of the 
stigmatized subjects. Although only one 
group could attribute the negative feedback 
to evaluator prejudice, it appears as though 
both groups were able to discount it. One 
possibility for this is that stigmatized 
individuals may be so accustomed to 
attributing negative feedback to external 
sources and then discounting it, that they 
do so even when these external attributions 
are unwarranted. 
Women in the prejudiced evaluator 
condition showed the smallest change self-
esteem scores (.36) between the first test 
and the second test. Also, men in the 
prejudiced evaluator condition showed the 
largest increase in self-esteem scores 
(3.33). However, neither of these score 
changes were found to be significant. 
Surprisingly, the men and women in the 
nonprejudiced evaluator condition showed 
almost exactly opposite responses to the 
negative feedback they received. The men 
showed an average decrease in self-esteem 
scores of 1.36, while the women showed 
an average increase of 1.27. Neither of 
these scores were significant. 
Since none of the means of the  
difference scores differed significantly 
from zero, it appears that no group of 
subjects was significantly impacted by the 
negative feedback that they received on 
their essay-writing task. The failure to 
obtain significant results in these cells 
appears to be partly due to flaws in the 
study. Significant values might have been 
achieved if two conditions had been 
present. First, if more subjects had 
participated in the study, the degrees of 
freedom in each cell would have been 
higher thus increasing the statistical power 
to detect an effect. If this were the case, the 
trends in subject responses may have 
continued, and significant changes in self-
esteem may have been seen in all of the 
cells except for the stigmatized/prejudiced 
evaluator condition. 
Also, if directional rather than non-
directional hypotheses were posed, a one-
tailed test rather than two-tailed t-test could 
have been computed, cutting the 
probability in half. In the two 
nonstigmatized conditions, this change 
would have yielded a probability of .06 for 
the nonprejudiced evaluator condition and a 
probability of .045 for the prejudiced 
evaluator condition. Coupled together, it 
appears that these two problems were 
partly responsible for the failure to achieve 
significant results in three of the t-tests, 
which would have been in line with this 
hypothesis, as well as the contact 
hypothesis. Support was shown for the 
contact hypothesis because interactions 
between stigmatized individuals (females) 
and nonstigmatized individuals (prejudiced 
evaluators) did not cause the self-esteem of 
the stigmatized persons to decrease. 
Despite strong theoretical support, 
the idea that stigmatization causes lowered 
self-esteem is not supported empirically. 
The counter-intuitive notion that 
stigmatization may, in fact, lead to equal or 
higher levels of self-esteem seems to be 
well supported both theoretically and 
empirically. Although stigmatization 
certainly has negative effects on many life 
areas, self-esteem does not appear to be 
one of them. It may be that when 
stigmatized people expect to fail and do, 
they are able to cope well with their failure. 
When they expect to succeed and do, the 
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results also may not greatly affect their 
self-esteem. However, when stigmatized 
group members expect to fail and yet they 
succeed, they may benefit from a large 
boost in self-esteem. This extra boost may, 
in turn, help them be more resilient against 
the forces of prejudice and discrimination, 
and thus help them to be more satisfied 
with themselves. 
Future studies should attempt to 
determine whether the failure to achieve 
significant results was due to the above 
mentioned design flaws or because the 
hypothesized effect does not exist. This 
could be done by increasing the number of 
participants in the study, and thus 
increasing the degrees of freedom, and by 
using a one-tailed rather than two-tailed t-
test. Another interesting study would 
involve determining exactly what the 
subjects attributed the negative evaluations 
to. A study of this sort would help to 
clarify the differences, similarities, or both 
that exist between stigmatized and 
nonstigmatized individuals in whether they 
attribute failure to either external or internal 
factors. Finally, an additional 
methodological consideration is to maintain 
concealment of the hypothesis from the 
subjects so as to avoid biased data that will 
have to be eliminated. 
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